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Plato’s Ion is of interest because it formulates a unique version of the 
critique of poetry under the guise of a critique of the rhapsode’s art. 
The dialogue gives special attention to an epistemological critique of 
poetry, but unlike the argument of Republic X, no special metaphysical 
commitments are invoked in support of it. Instead, the argument rests 
solely on the question of whether poetry is structured like a technê,1 
in terms of what and how it knows. The Ion also features an elaborate 
discussion of the nature of poetic inspiration expressed in images of 
magnets and bees, which would become a staple of the subsequent poetic 
tradition. As in the Phaedrus, inspiration is presented here as a sort of 
madness, as a case of possession by the gods, and the ability that comes 
from it is characterized as divine dispensation [theia moira]. The absence 
of any reference to a theory of ideas suggests that the Ion is an early 
composition, having more in common with the Euthyphro, for example, 
than the Republic. But no important conclusion in this essay depends on 
holding any particular opinion as to the date of its composition. Whether 
it is early or late, we can detect the seriousness of Plato’s inquiry even 
through the comic character of the conversation he depicts for us. Poetry is 
indeed to be criticized—it does not know what we think it knows. But the 
case is more complicated than that, since Plato also undermines the very 
terms of Socrates’ argument in such as way as to point to the poet’s role 
in shaping and giving meaning to political life. Thus while it may appear 
that Socrates offers a sharp distinction between inspiration and technê as 
the basis of an epistemological standard against which poetry must fall 
short, the examples he invokes only show how inseparable these two ideas 
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actually are. When Ion admits to being inspired, what he reveals is the 
technical side of his craft, and when Socrates tries to explain why technai 
know what they do, he presents this as a gift of the gods. The upshot 
of this is that far from banishing the poets from the city, the paradoxes 
inherent in Socrates’ argument in this dialogue reveal the decisive role 
poetry must play in political life. But this only becomes clear to the extent 
that, as readers, we take those paradoxes as so many provocations and 
challenges issued to us by Plato and respond accordingly.2 
The Ion has not received much attention in the scholarly literature, but 
what there is follows the pattern of responses to the critiques of poetry 
found elsewhere in the Platonic corpus. That is, Plato’s view of poetry 
seems not to ﬁnd a sympathetic modern audience, and scholarly reaction 
reﬂects this by seeking in one way or another to deﬂect the force of it. 
Common strategies include: 1) identifying a hidden and ironic poeticism 
on Plato’s part, or 2) locating the critique in the context of a political 
program or of a set of speciﬁable metaphysical commitments that can 
themselves be critiqued;3 or ﬁnally 3) interpreting the critique as the 
assertion of an epistemological standard for literary criticism.4 There is 
some truth that must be recognized in each of these responses. But they 
are also distorted by a sort of hermeneutic extremism in which the speciﬁc 
terms of the argument Socrates actually presents go unexamined. Terms 
like technê or inspiration are hardly seamless semantic unities simply 
available for manipulation according to logical rules. The important work 
of the dialogue (and of its reader) is precisely to sort out what these terms 
mean and how they relate to each other. In this essay, I hope to focus 
attention on the terms of the argument to see what Plato thinks of them, 
as well as what he thinks Socrates’ critique of poetry accomplishes. 
The ostensible goal of Socrates’ argument in the Ion is to show that in 
every case the person in possession of a technê will be able to explain poetry 
better than the rhapsode. Socrates also seems to imply that by comparison 
to the person with a technê, the poet himself does not know the truth of 
what he speaks about. If he speaks well, it will be because the gods have 
inspired him, not because of his own knowledge. But one question that is 
not generally asked concerns how Socrates gets Ion to concede these points 
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so apparently contrary to his personal interest. What exactly does Socrates 
mean by technê? In what sense is a technê organized according to some 
sort of knowledge? And how can it be distinguished from the skills of the 
poet or the rhapsode? If we consider the examples of technai Socrates uses 
to persuade Ion—prophecy, arithmetic, charioteering, ﬁshing, navigation, 
generalship, etc.—we can see that this is no simple category. It should be 
immediately apparent that there is no single epistemic structure common 
to the so-called technê of prophecy and that of navigation, or to arithmetic 
and ﬁshing. If what distinguishes any technê from rhapsody or poetry is 
knowledge, we would do well to ask how a person with a technê knows. 
If no common epistemic thread can be found, we will be hard pressed to 
exclude rhapsody and poetry from the category of technai.5 I think that a 
sober reading of the argument must lead us to conclude that Socrates has 
not succeeded in making his case by this standard. Why then does Plato 
depict Socrates making this argument and Ion persuaded by it for us?
Socrates’ argument is puzzling in another sense as well. The inquiry 
Socrates initiates concerns Ion’s ability as an interpreter. He assiduously 
keeps Ion’s other skill as a performer of the poet’s words, a demonstration 
of which is always on offer, ‘offstage’. What is enviable about being a 
rhapsode, Socrates says, is that one is obliged to learn the thought [dianoia] 
of the poet and not just his words: “For the rhapsode must become an 
interpreter [hermêneus] of the poet’s thought for the audience” (530c). 
Yet we can hardly help but notice that Socrates subtly shifts the question 
away from the skill of interpreting the poet’s thought and toward the 
task of judging the accuracy of his words as descriptive of speciﬁc facts. 
In relation to the latter task, it is clearly the case that an expert on a given 
topic will be a better judge, or even more, that the rhapsode or poet will 
only be able to judge these things to the extent that they also have this 
other expertise. Their abilities as poets or rhapsodes will be of no use. But 
what is not apparent is how this simple truth bears any relevance to the 
inquiry into the rhapsode’s (or the poet’s) knowledge. The poet and the 
rhapsode do not merely report facts in any ordinary sense of the word. 
Some sort of accuracy may be necessary to poetry, but this is hardly the 
goal of the poet’s work.6 By the same token, the rhapsode’s interpretation 
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of the poet’s thought cannot be restricted to fact checking without some 
violence. In this regard, I think we can see that the peculiar examples 
of technai Socrates invokes play an important role in persuading Ion to 
overlook this discrepancy. 
We can see the subtlety of Socrates’ technique in the first set of 
comparisons. Ion has asserted that he is only skilled at interpreting Homer, 
but not the other poets. Socrates wants to use the singular narrowness 
of Ion’s interest in Homer to highlight the general applicability of the 
knowledge that is to be associated with technê. The starting point for 
Socrates is to suggest someone who Ion must concede would be better 
able than he is to interpret relevant passages in Homer and Hesiod. 
When Socrates asks who “would be better at explaining what these two 
poets say … about prophecy [mantikê] … ?” (531b), Ion readily concedes 
that a seer [mantis] would be better than he. Now, it seems unlikely that 
Ion thinks a seer would explain better what we might call the literary 
differences between Homer and Hesiod. If the seer has any expertise, its 
only relevance can be in judging the accuracy of the poet’s words. This 
would obviously be true of any technê: technical expertise is only relevant 
to judging the accuracy of a poet’s account. It can have little to say about 
the meaning of the poet’s thought, or the literary quality of its formal 
presentation. But even more striking, however, it seems clear enough 
that mantikê is no ordinary skill, perhaps not even a technê at all! It hardly 
seems to embody the hallmarks we associate with crafts or skills generally 
and particularly not the one we are primarily interested in here, namely 
knowledge. The mantis can hardly be said to know what he is talking about, 
even as he is credited with somehow seeing the future. To the extent that 
mantikê depends upon or culminates in a prophetic vision that emerges 
in an ecstatic experience, it seems much more like the case of inspiration 
that Socrates will describe later as an alternative to technê.
And yet it seems likely that when Ion concedes that the seer can explain 
the poets better than he can, he is thinking of the mantis as someone who 
has access to a distinctive sort of experience he himself lacks. In the face 
of the seer’s familiarity with the shape of an ecstatic experience, the 
distinction between interpreting the thoughts of the poet and judging the 
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accuracy of his words might well seem to disappear. Moreover, the seer is 
perhaps the premier example of an interpreter, insofar as he experiences a 
hidden truth in things that the rest of us cannot see. He sees present events 
as portents of the future, a gift of the gods that allows him to see the world 
as they do, if only brieﬂy. A rhapsode might well wonder whether there is 
something hidden in the seer’s experience that must exceed the limits of 
whatever interpretive skills he may have, and thereby efface the difference 
between judging the accuracy of the poet’s words and interpreting his 
thought. He would be mistaken in thinking so, though it would perhaps 
be a natural mistake. But even if mantikê is hardly a technê in any ordinary 
sense of the word, and even if interpretation has been reduced to judging 
the accuracy of the poet’s words, Socrates has induced Ion to admit that 
someone other than a rhapsode is able to interpret Homer. 
The subsequent comparisons introduce the arts of arithmetic and 
medicine to show that the same person will be able to distinguish both 
the good and the bad speakers on any subject, namely the person who has 
the relevant technê. These cases are less troublesome instances of technai: 
they appear to have the hallmarks of a technê, namely a traditional set of 
techniques that can be handed down, and a practitioner who can be said 
to know what he works on. We might quibble about arithmetic that it has 
no ordinary work, that it depends upon axioms whose truth cannot be 
examined by arithmetic, and that it is not simply the special province of 
an expert—most adults already possess arithmetic to some degree. But 
Ion can overlook these quibbles without sacriﬁcing his own personal right 
to claim the ability to make judgments about number in Homer—even 
if he would no longer be making these judgments as a rhapsode. The case 
of the doctor is perhaps more telling, as it forces him to relinquish any 
claim to authority in judging the poet’s words. Though even in this case, 
we might wonder what and how the doctor knows. He seems to know 
what treatments are usually effective, but he may not know why they 
are effective, or what underlying process of the disease they respond to. 
Thus, while arithmetic and medicine are easily recognizable examples of 
technai, it is clear enough that they do not know what they know in the 
same way. There is no simple, uniform epistemic structure common to 
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the technai Socrates chooses as examples.
Socrates hopes to draw a general conclusion from these three cases, 
namely “that the same person will always know, when several people 
speak about the same subject, who speaks well and who speaks badly” 
(531e). We can clearly see that Ion has been snookered into accepting this 
conclusion, since Socrates has not shown the relevance of other technai 
to the task of interpreting the poet’s thoughts, nor has he provided any 
reason to think that all arts behave similarly enough with regard to 
how and what they know to support such a general claim about them. 
Socrates’ use of the seer is virtually an invitation from Plato to consider 
the possibility that they do not. With regard to the ﬁrst problem, it is worth 
noting that Socrates has introduced the notion of speaking well or badly 
[eu legein kai kakôs] as if to blur the difference between the poet’s thought 
and the accuracy of his words. But we ought to ask ourselves whether 
even this narrow conclusion is true. Is it the case that the same person 
will always know who speaks well or badly? Is there no possibility of an 
overlap among technai? Are there not perhaps also gaps where no technê 
is available to make this judgment?7 As a side note, however we choose 
to answer these questions, we can hardly avoid noticing that this work 
of judging who speaks well or badly describes an activity (I hesitate to 
call it a technê just yet) very close to Socrates’ own heart, namely dialectic 
itself. Here we see one reason why this conversation is with a rhapsode 
rather than a poet—it allows dialectic to come into view.
If the man with a technê always knows both who speaks well and 
who speaks badly on any given subject, and if all the poets speak on 
more or less the same subjects, then the fact that Ion has nothing to say 
about the other poets can only mean one thing: “it is clear to anyone 
that [Ion is] unable to speak about Homer with technê and knowledge 
[epistêmê]” (532c).8 This is a straightforward implication of what has 
already been agreed to. But Socrates immediately expands the generality 
of this conclusion to include all technai by asserting that “the principle of 
inquiry is the same in all technai” (532d). The gist of it is that experience 
shows us that experts can always judge all the practitioners of a given 
technê, and can always judge both what they do well and badly. The list 
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of examples—painting, sculpture, ﬂute playing, kithara-playing, singing 
and ﬁnally rhapsody—seems straightforward enough, though it also 
contains a good bit of wit at Ion’s expense. For example, Ion is asked if 
he has ever met anyone who can explain the works of legendary ﬁgures 
like Daedalus, or Epeius,9 but not those of other sculptors. Similarly, has 
he met anyone who can explain the work of Olympos,10 or Orpheus, or 
Phemius,11 but not that of Ion! 
Apart from the humor in these exchanges, we should also be struck by 
the peculiar question with which Socrates introduces this argument: “the 
art of poetry is in some way a whole, isn’t it?” (532c). Ion answers meekly: 
“Yes.” But what can this question mean? It’s clear enough that Socrates 
hopes an afﬁrmative answer will ground his claim that the same person 
can always judge all practitioners of an art. This claim certainly seems to 
imply that every art is somehow “a whole.” But how can it be true? Was 
poetry a whole before the historical emergence of tragedy? Or of New 
Comedy? Was geometry a whole before the discovery of incommensurable 
magnitudes? Was arithmetic a whole before the development of algebra? If 
so, were these developments somehow already latent in them? It is difﬁcult 
to know how to answer these questions, or even what they signify. Oddly 
enough, for the purposes of Socrates’ argument, it makes no difference 
how we choose to answer. Whether we say that arts are not wholes, or 
that they are, but only in the sense of a latent, eidetic wholeness, the 
consequence is the same, namely that nobody can possess any technê as a 
whole. Here we see that Ion meekly goes along with Socrates just where 
we would have to disagree. 
We are thus left with the peculiar fact that Ion speaks without technê 
and yet “is the best among men at discussing Homer … and everyone 
says that [he] speaks well, though concerning the other poets he does 
not” (533c). Socrates’ explanation of this fact is the centerpiece of the 
entire dialogue and deserves careful attention. It consists of two lengthy 
speeches by Socrates and a couple of exchanges with Ion in which what 
looks like a theory of inspiration is worked out. Socrates tells Ion that he 
speaks well about Homer not because of any technê he might possess, but 
because of a divine power [theia de dunamis] [533d]. This power is like that 
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of the magnet, which both attracts iron rings and empowers them to attract 
other rings. The muse is a sort of magnet, and Homer and Ion have been 
magnetized and magnetize others. The point is that the poets speak “not 
from technê, but because they are inspired and possessed” (533e). Socrates 
speaks quite beautifully in the ﬁrst speech, perhaps even poetically, and 
this has tempted many readers to hear in this passage a latent poeticism on 
Plato’s part. Ion himself responds to it as if to a poem, saying “Somehow 
you touch my soul with your words, Socrates, and the good poets do seem 
to me to interpret for us the words of the gods by divine dispensation 
[theia moira]” (535a). That Ion reacts in this way should give us some pause 
before taking Socrates’ poetic speech at face value, and especially before 
presuming to ﬁnd in it a wink and a nod toward poetry.12
After a brief interlude in which he probes Ion’s personal experience as 
a rhapsode for conﬁrmation of the notion that he is somehow out of his 
senses when he speaks, Socrates reiterates the central points of the ﬁrst 
speech. But this time he speaks much more bluntly, much less poetically. 
He also expands the image of the magnet to include all sorts of ancillary 
performers. And this time Ion responds rather differently: “You speak 
well, Socrates, but I will be surprised if you can speak well enough to 
persuade me that I am possessed and mad when I praise Homer” (536d). 
Ion is no longer carried away by the power of Socrates’ imagery. Now 
he sees the consequence for him of Socrates’ extravagant ideas about 
inspiration. If Ion is merely inspired, his distinction as the best rhapsode 
evaporates. He will be unable to distinguish himself not only from the 
other rhapsodes, but also from that crowd of ancillary performers. In the 
ﬁrst speech, the ﬂorid imagery invited him to compare himself to the 
poets, while the second speech relegates him to a much more derivative 
position. The precariousness and absurdity of his position is brought out 
in the interlude, in which Socrates induces him to agree that he is both 
moved and unmoved by the emotional energy of the poetry he performs. 
His eyes ﬁll with tears, his hair stands on end, his heart ﬂutters, depending 
on the passage. But at the same time, he carefully scans the audience for 
the same reactions: “I have to pay careful attention to them, for if I make 
them cry, I laugh for the money I make, but if they laugh, I myself cry for 
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the money lost” (535e). The point is not that Ion is a fraud. The duality he 
expresses is in the very nature of his performance.13 But it is clear enough 
that however inspiration organizes his performance, it can hardly serve 
to ground his interpretive claims in some sort of knowledge.
To make this last point a little clearer we can distinguish between Ion’s 
claim to be an interpreter of poetry and his claim to be a performer. It is 
clear from his own account that as a performer he is anything but “possessed 
and mad.” He seems instead to be the very image of self-possession; able 
to control his own visceral reactions to the material he performs so as to 
create a particular effect in his audience. As a performer he displays at least 
some of the hallmarks of technê, at least if we still think we can recognize 
a technê. As an interpreter of poetry the situation seems to be similar. He 
is hardly likely to be inspired. And yet he seems equally unlikely to have 
the sort of theoretical self-possession that could provide an independent 
foundation for his insights. Nothing we have heard from him in this 
dialogue suggests any other conclusion about him. It is also clear that 
we have in the case of the rhapsode two rather distinct functions each 
one of which implies distinctive skills and abilities, but which also imply 
some overlap between them. The performer cannot help but work out an 
interpretation of some sort to guide him through his performance, just as 
the interpreter imagines a performance in which the tonality and register 
of the speeches are concretely determined. If rhapsody were a technê, it 
could not be a whole to the extent that it is not a simple unity.
This interlude also has interesting consequences for Socrates’ own 
theory of inspiration. He has himself moved Ion by his words in the 
ﬁrst speech, which suggests that even Socrates in one of his more poetic 
moments can function as the poet or muse his own theory imagines. But 
the rest of the passage shows that Ion was hardly out of his mind. That 
he rejects the same idea when it is presented in less ﬂattering terms in the 
second speech suggests that he never loses sight of the implications of 
either speech for his own reputation. Far from an ecstatic experience, this 
passage is much more an example of self-possession. To the extent that 
Socrates seeks conﬁrmation for his theory of inspiration in the interlude 
by probing Ion’s experience as a rhapsode, we would have to say that he 
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does not ﬁnd it either in that experience or in Ion’s opposite reaction to 
the two speeches. This is hardly a refutation of the theory, but it is also 
clear that neither is Plato giving it a ringing endorsement. We might well 
see in this passage not the elaboration of a theory, but an object lesson in 
the way theoretical opinions function in human discourse. The theory is 
‘true’: the muse does indeed work through Socrates’ speech to move Ion. 
But in its presentation the theory undermines itself: Ion is not moved in 
any way contrary to his astute sense of his own self-interest.14 The self-
canceling quality of Plato’s presentation of this theory of inspiration is 
underlined by being uttered by the very person who purports to speak 
only the simple (unmusical?) truth. The muse is at work here precisely 
in not being at work. 
This seems to me to represent the climax of the dialogue, the moment 
in which all of its intellectual energies come to a head. And in a way that 
is characteristic of the Platonic dialogues, the climax takes the form of a 
paradox. The question immediately confronts us as readers: where can we 
go from here? The rest of the dialogue offers no resolution of this impasse. 
Ion perversely reiterates his by now discredited position that he speaks 
best, and is thereby knowledgeable, about all things in Homer. Socrates 
then reminds him of the bearing of his previous admissions concerning 
the superiority of the person with a technê. Ion is ﬁnally reduced to the 
claim that at least he knows best what a general should say; even that 
the general’s art and the rhapsode’s are the same. My own answer to 
our question would be that this impasse is itself an expression of the 
conﬂict between poetry and philosophy, that the conﬂict is irresolvable 
and determinative of both parties. But Plato seems to me to point us to a 
richer answer precisely in this ﬁnal section of the dialogue. I say this in 
part because even though the intellectual energy of the dialogue seems 
to reach a peak in the account of inspiration, the comic energy of the 
dialogue reaches a peak only afterwards.15 We catch a glimpse of this in 
the various passages from Homer Socrates mockingly misquotes. Ion, for 
his part, responds by stubbornly refusing to give in to Socrates’ argument. 
If we look closely at this section of the dialogue, we may begin to see how 
Plato understands the signiﬁcance of this conﬂict.
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Three things stand out in this ﬁnal section of the dialogue. First, even 
though Socrates largely reiterates the basic terms of his earlier argument 
that the person with the relevant technê will always know best who speaks 
well or badly about a given subject, he highlights all of our earlier concerns 
about technê as a category when he says: “And to each of the arts hasn’t it 
been apportioned by god to be able to know a particular business?” (537c). 
The epistemic correlation of each technê and the object of its work [ergon] 
is central to his argument. And yet here Socrates presents it as the result 
of a divine dispensation—the arts are organized as they are by a sort of 
theia moira. Second, Socrates offers two passages from Homer concerning 
mantikê that are ostensibly chosen to show the seer’s interpretive privilege. 
But it is clear on examining them that no such privilege can exist. In the ﬁrst 
passage, Homer tells of the portentous vision Theoclymenus announces to 
the suitors of their imminent doom. He is startled to see them transﬁgured 
as dead souls shrouded in an evil mist. In the second passage, an eagle 
ﬂies by the Trojan host on the left carrying a writhing snake in its claws. 
The snake strikes the bird and is dropped in the middle of the army. In 
the ﬁrst case, Homer describes an ecstatic experience, the meaning of 
which is apparent to the reader, but whose import the suitors themselves 
cannot appreciate. In the second case, the meaning of the omen is clear to 
all who see it except Hector, namely that the Trojans will not prevail, and 
will not escape from this battle unbloodied. It seems unlikely that a seer 
could tell us anything important about the accuracy of these passages. 
And about the signiﬁcance of them, especially the way in which the 
truth of one’s situation can suddenly present itself to a man and remain 
incomprehensible to him, the seer can have no privileged insight. This is 
a human insight available to any one of us, though the poet brings it to 
our attention in especially vivid and compelling terms.
The third thing that stands out in this ﬁnal section is Ion’s assertion 
that if he knows nothing else in Homer, at least “he will know what 
is appropriate for a general exhorting his men to say” (540d). Socrates 
artfully induces Ion to adopt the more extreme position that there is no 
difference between the art of the rhapsode and that of the general. This 
extravagant claim allows him playfully to accuse Ion of being as deceptive 
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as Proteus, shifting from one technê to another “until ﬁnally you escape 
me in the guise of a general” (541e). Thus Ion is left to choose between 
the accusation of being a deceitful possessor of some as yet undisclosed 
art, or of being an artless divine. At ﬁrst glance, Ion’s claim that as the 
best rhapsode he is also the best general seems absurd, and Socrates’ ad 
hominem argument—why hasn’t he been chosen to be a general by any of 
the Greeks?—seems sufﬁciently persuasive. But his initial statement—that 
he would know how a general ought to exhort his men, and that he learned 
this from Homer—is not so farfetched, and Socrates’ reply does not really 
address it.16 It is clear enough that there is much about strategy that Ion 
could not learn from Homer, or from any poet for that matter. Only actual 
military experience and training can teach these things. But as for giving 
a stirring speech to men about to enter battle, it is not so clear how one 
should learn this. Even more important, it is clear enough that the man 
trained in strategy may well have no expertise to bring to bear on the 
task of judging whether Homer speaks well about how a general should 
speak to his men. Generalship thus occupies a double role in the argument 
of the Ion—it is clearly a technê whose expertise Ion cannot simply have, 
and on the subject of strategy it may well have something more to say 
about whether Homer has spoken well or badly than Ion does. But at the 
same time, on the subject of exhortation, it is by no means necessary that 
Ion cannot share this expertise, or that he cannot have this expertise as a 
rhapsode. We might say that in the technê of the general, Socrates’ claims 
about the hermeneutic superiority of technê in general is both conﬁrmed 
and undermined.
 It is also worth noting that the general’s relationship to his men and 
the dangers they face in battle is not a simple one. In exhorting them to 
courage in battle he speaks to them as someone who has a dual role. He 
speaks as a soldier and gives voice to the fears they experience in order 
to help them overcome them. But he does not feel the same fears, nor 
does he face precisely the same dangers. It is, of course, possible for a 
general to ﬁght alongside his men, and he may do so precisely to build 
their morale. This shows that the distinction is a ﬂuid one. Nevertheless, 
there is a real difference here. When he exhorts his men, he represents 
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their conﬁdence to them in his own person, much as Ion represents to 
his audience the reaction he wants them to have in his own person. If the 
similarity ended here, however, we would only have a cautionary tale on 
the dangers of poetic representation: namely that it can usurp even the 
most indispensable forms of political authority without the appropriate 
knowledge. Our inability to provide a genuine foundation for the technical 
argument Socrates wants to make about the shortcomings of rhapsodes 
and poets would then be alarming indeed. This may well be one reason 
for the sharpness and persistence of Plato’s critique of poetry. He sees 
the political danger posed by the poet’s unrestricted authority, but sees 
no way to curtail it on purely rational grounds. But there is also another 
side to Plato’s thinking about poetry, and this may be the more important 
result of the dialogue. What I mean is that we can also see in the duality 
of the general’s technê a shortcoming that may well require the need of 
poetic supplementation. The general’s exhortation may be even more 
important than his strategic ability, since it is in exhorting his men to ﬁnd 
their own courage in his conﬁdence that he helps them become complete, 
well-rounded citizens of the city they ﬁght for. The point isn’t merely that 
generals may need to learn something from poets, but that the city itself 
depends on the poet to craft the basis of its unity in the speeches it uses 
to bring the citizens to a shared sense of their duties and responsibilities. 
This, it seems to me, is an under-appreciated aspect of the vision of poetry 
that Plato entertains in the Ion, the one that he has Socrates provoke us to 
see. Its relevance to the philosophic inquiry undertaken in the Republic is 
clear enough. What is not so clear is what sort of turn Plato’s own shift 
from inspiration, or theia moira, towards mimêsis as the primary image of 
poetic activity represents in terms of the two sides of his thinking about 
poetry. But that is a question for another paper.
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Notes
1  The Greek word technê has a broader range of meanings than art, or craft, or skill. In addition to 
covering both what we would call ﬁne arts and crafts, it also covers the range of skills associated 
with the various trades and professions, and even some elements of what we would call science. 
Unlike some uses of the English word art, technê usually implies some sort of knowledge, though 
typically the knowledge is less theoretical than practical, rather like what is called ‘know-how.’
2  Kathleen Freeman provides an interesting model for this sort of reading (Freeman: 1940, 140-142, 
146-148). 
3  Paul Woodruff makes the best case for this approach (Woodruff, 1982: 138 ff.). Rosamund Sprague 
also makes a case for this sort of reading (Sprague, 1973: xiv-xv, 1).
4  Craig LaDriere argues that in this dialogue, Plato fails to see the true signiﬁcance of a genuine 
literary critical technique, a failure he see as being consistent with “the more extended 
dissertations of the Republic, and with the same great oversight” (Ladriere, 1951: 33). Interestingly, 
LaDriere also imagines contrasting this oversight with the possibility of a corrective in Aristotle’s 
Poetics.
5  There is evidence that prior to the 5th century the poets understood themselves as possessors 
of some sort of knowledge, even as they also paid homage to the muses. Moreover, terms in 
general usage, like mousikê and poietikê, imply that poetry was commonly understood to be a sort 
of technê. But there is also some evidence that during the 5th century poets began to be seen as 
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more dependent upon the muses as sources both of insight and ability. On the evolution of these 
distinctions see Havelock’s landmark study (1967: 156 ff.), also Murray (1981: 89-92, 94-100). This 
suggests that the terms of the debate formulated here by Socrates already had some currency. See 
also Woodruff on the signiﬁcance of Plato’s contrast of inspiration and technê (Woodruff, 1982: 
144-148).
6  As Freeman points out, “the recital of ﬁshing technicalities in the language of the average 
ﬁsherman would empty the theatre in ﬁve minutes” (Freeman, 1940: 141).
7  Sprague also observes the extreme distinctness, or separateness, that Socrates imports into his 
conception of technê, though she comes to a different conclusion about its signiﬁcance (Sprague, 
1973: 11).
8  This is the ﬁrst time Socrates uses the term epistêmê, which, in addition to signifying knowledge 
in the sense of technical ‘know-how’, also carries the connotation of a more scientiﬁc mode of 
knowing. 
9  Epeius designed the wooden horse at Troy (Od. viii, 493).
10  Olympos is a mythical ﬁgure sometimes credited with inventing music.
11  Phemius sings for the suitors in Odysseus’ house (Od. i, 154; xxii, 330).
12  I am indebted for much of my sense of the irony of Socrates’ two long speeches on inspiration to 
Jacob Klein, who points out the peculiarity of Socrates’ role as inspiring muse to Ion (Klein, 1985: 
351-353). 
13  For a useful discussion of this seemingly contradictory feature of performance, see Dorter (1973: 
71-73), also Henning (1964: 246-247).
14  I am indebted to John White for his discussion of self-cancellation in Plato’s thinking about poetry 
in Book X of the Republic (White, 2007: 324ff, 338, 342-346).
15  I am thinking here not merely of the fact that there are still some humorous elements in the last 
section of the dialogue, but also of the way in which the trajectory of the conversation follows a 
recognizably comic pattern. Ion’s role as an alazôn, or blocking character, has not yet been fully 
expressed, nor has his conﬂict and reconciliation with Socrates (the eirôn) run its course. See 
Jerrald Ranta for an interesting, preliminary discussion of comic motifs in the Ion. He works out 
some of the important generic details of comedy as they present themselves in the dialogue, 
especially the signiﬁcance of Socrates’ irony as a mode of the comic eirôn (Ranta, 1967: 220-
222). Any substantial study of this dialogue ought to account for the signiﬁcance of the generic 
elements of comedy that organize it.
16  John D. Moore argues for the plausibility of Ion’s claim, at least to a 5th century Athenian 
audience, on historical grounds (Moore, 1973: 49ff).
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